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Abstract | This study analyzes the mechanism of the conservative political shift in the 
Abe Shinzō administration, focusing on the interaction between the Liberal Democratic 
Party’s (LDP) coping strategies and a series of political reforms that have led the 
structural changes in the Japanese political process. The paper examines the input and 
output structure of political reforms presented by Abe and the LDP at the three levels of 
government, party, and social constituency. First, the conservative shift emerged from 
the input process of political reforms. Since the 1990s, amid a series of political reforms 
that has taken place under anti-clientelism, the rivalry between the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) and the LDP led policy competition. In the end, a comprehensive social 
reform of the LDP emerged as a compelling alternative to construct a new Japanese 
system. The conservative shift has deepened through the output process of the political 
reforms. Under the political reform that promoted the unification of the ruling party 
and the government, meetings of the Council of Policy Advisers became a routine 
practice. In addition, the special offices under the president of the party increased their 
influence, and the governance of the ruling party using policy specialists (zoku giin) and 
preliminary review system was established. Overall, there has been a simplification in 
policy decision process and acceleration of policy implementation regarding the 
reforms for the conservative political shift. On the other hand, this unity and 
improvement of policy momentum enhanced the government’s performance for Abe 
and the LDP. This led the LDP to rise as a dominant political party again. Furthermore, 
the movement of the conservative shift in the Abe era has been further strengthened by 
linking with the partisan realignment that combines the traditional conservatives and 
the neoconservatives.
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Introduction 
Japan is undergoing comprehensive reforms under the slogan of “departure 
from the postwar regime” (sengo rejīmu kara no dakkyaku). The reforms include 
political, economic, and social changes. In addition, there is a dominant view 
that the political landscape of Japan has turned conservative under new right-
wing political forces led by Abe Shinzō (Nakano 2016; Kinoshita 2014; Tsukada 
2017). However, this is different from the right-wing shift of Japanese society. 
There is an agreement that the preference of majority voters and right-wing 
political planning are not related (Takenaka, Endō, and Willy 2015; Taniguchi 
2015). Nonetheless, the current Japanese party politics is under the control of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as a result of successive victories from the 
previous three general elections. Since the LDP returned to power in 2012, it 
secured a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. The overwhelming 
victory of the LDP weakened the opposition’s power in inter-party and intra-
party competition (Takayasu 2014; Machitori 2015; Makihara 2016; Nakakita 
2017). As a result, a series of conservative reforms led by Prime Minister Abe is 
underway. If Japan’s political landscape did not shift right, but is rather a reform 
of the new right-wing political leadership and the failure of the opposition 
party, how can we define the changes in Japanese politics?
In order to answer the question, this study focuses on coping strategies of 
the political forces to find out how conservative shifts are derived from and 
deepened in the Abe era. If Japan’s conservatism is emerging as a result of the 
new right-wing political forces, it is necessary to clarify how the strategic 
responses of the political forces act in the politico-social domain and electoral 
policy process. Indeed, it is imperative to examine the following questions. What 
are the strategic responses of political parties and political elites that led to the 
conservative political shift? What kind of electoral effectiveness does the reform 
politics of the conservative shift have? What kind of process would accelerate 
the policies for the conservative shift? Moreover, how did the LDP’s continuous 
victories in elections relate to the Abe government’s performance to pursue 
conservative reforms? 
This study avoids a one-sided analysis that only focuses on Prime Minister 
Abe’s policy orientation or his personality. Instead, the study focuses on the 
political reforms promoted by Abe-LDP at the three levels of government, 
political party, and social constituency. This is because a series of political 
reforms that have confirmed structural changes in Japanese politics and the 
coping strategy of Abe-LDP are likely to be highly interactive. It is widely 
known that “reform” has been an issue in Japanese politics for the past thirty 
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years. There was a political and social consensus that Japan has an urgent need 
to establish an “alternative system” to replace the “Japanese system.” This 
awareness was due to rapid changes in the domestic and foreign environment 
that has threatened Japan since the 1990s. Indeed, Japan has carried out reforms 
for a long time, varying in both scope and purpose. However, there are still calls 
for reform in Japanese society. The departure from the postwar regime of the 
Abe administration is a part of these reforms. In fact, the “postwar period” 
conveys a distinct characteristic historically and structurally in Japan. Abe’s 
reform aims to promote overall regime transformation from the “postwar 
period.” It distinguishes Abe’s reforms from previous attempts which explicitly 
define their scope and objectives. Abe’s reforms constitute a comprehensive 
conservative shift that includes administration, education, economy, 
employment, central-provincial relations, diplomacy, and security. These 
reforms posit a structural transformation. They call for a constitutional 
amendment that can help to build a state system which corresponds to the 
changes of the times. 
In essence, this study focuses on the changes in the multi-layered structure 
(government-party-social constituency) linking the electoral process and the 
policy process. The study then examines the mechanism of the conservative 
shift in Japan through the implementation and results of the Abe-LDP’s 
conservative reforms.1  
Analytical Perspective: A Qualitative Change in Japanese Politics 
and a Multi-layered Structure of Political Processes
There is a strong interest in the Korean academic community regarding the 
phenomenon of the conservative shift in Japan. In particular, studies on 
domestic political processes analyzed the increasing power of the prime 
minister and party leader and their charismatic politics (e.g. Han Euisuok 2014). 
From social and economic perspectives, there are studies on the economic 
recession and social structure change (Yi Chŏng-hwan 2014; Kim Yong-bok 
1. Rather than grasping the content of the conservative political shift in individual policy and their 
compatibility with conservative ideology, this study focuses on understanding the reality of the 
conservative political reform, which is the key ruling ideology of the Abe era. This will help to 
understand how the conservative political shift in Japan took place through the political reforms 
proposed by the Abe-LDP that are linked with the electoral-policy process. The political reforms 
proposed by the Abe-LDP follow the catchphrase of the Abe era, the departure from postwar 
regime, and set an overall reform agenda that emphasizes community, tradition and nationalistic 
elements when implementing individual policies.  
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2016), changes in the composition and consciousness of political actors due to 
generation change (Ko Sŏn-gyu 2014; Park Cheol Hee 2014; Yi I-bŏm 2015, 
Kyŏng Che-hŭi 2017), and changes in organizational management, such as the 
decline of traditional support bases and personal support organizations (Kim 
Sang-jun and Kim Ji-gang 2013; Lee Jukyung 2016a). They describe various 
reasons that promote the conservative shift. 
Although the above studies differ in subject of analysis and research method, 
they provide a logical clue to understand the changes in the Abe era for the 
following reasons. First, they attempt a rational approach to the phenomenon of 
the conservative shift. While there is controversy about whether the political 
terrain in Japan is conservative or not, and the criteria to determine a conservative 
shift is vague, it is a clear fact that the LDP is emphasizing its own ideological 
position as the conservative party since the Abe era began. In this sense, the 
above studies are based on the changes in the consciousness and behavior of the 
political forces and the reactions and evaluations of the social forces. These 
balanced analyses are distinct from the “right wing extremism” discourses that 
concern the return to militarism or historical revisionism. 
Second, the research is consistent with the main empirical studies in Japan 
that clarify the changes in the political process. The main concern of Japanese 
researchers is to understand the volatility of Japanese politics. Since the 1990s, 
the Japanese political process has been changing, which includes party politics, 
policymaking, and voting behavior. Thus, the studies focus on understanding 
the political volatility rather than clarifying the phenomenon of the conservative 
shift. The studies commonly pointed out the strengthening of policymaking 
centered on the prime minister (Makihara 2013; Takayasu 2014; Machitori 
2015), the political elite’s preference change on individual political issues 
(Taniguchi 2015; Tatehayashi 2017), and the tendency of voting behavior to 
focus on government operating status rather than ideology (Hirano 2015; 
Yamada 2017). These studies share the same factors as the analysis of the 
conservative shift in Japan, which depicts the importance of the studies. 
Consequently, these studies explain the qualitative changes in Japanese politics, 
both directly and indirectly.  
However, in order to understand the phenomenon of the conservative shift 
in the Abe era, certain important issues have to be clarified. The previous 
research only focused on analyzing the factors of the conservative shift (or the 
qualitative change in Japanese politics). There was no clear explanation of how 
the conservative policies were created and strengthened. The conservative 
movement of Japan’s domestic and foreign policies from the Abe cabinet in 2012 
is clearly distinguishable from the previous ones. Considering this difference, it 
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is important to explain the causes of the policies for the conservative shift in this 
period and how the conservative shift has intensified. 
Figure 1 is an alternative analytical framework suggested by this study to 
understand the formation and strengthening of the conservative reforms in the 
Abe era. The analytical framework is different from the existing interpretation 
in the following two aspects. First, two structures constitute the political process, 
input process and output process. This study examines how the conservative 
planning developed through the input process before showing how the 
conservative shift deepened through the output process. This study’s focus on 
the process of the conservative shift differentiates it from the mainstream 
perspectives which discuss the changes in the Japanese political process. Other 
mainstream studies have a theoretical perspective of institutional change and 
factor analysis based on behaviorism.2
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Figure 1. The Qualitative Change in Japanese Politics and the Multi-layered Structure for 
the Political Process of Conservative Political Shift
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The second characteristic of the analytical framework is that it uses a multi-
layered structure for the conservative shift. It focuses on the strategic actions of 
the political forces that have led the conservative shift. This helps to explain how 
their behavior patterns are projected at each level of government, party, and 
social constituency. For example, the framework analyzes how reforms of the 
conservative shift were combined and accumulated, which processes were used 
to produce them, and how these policies are related to strategies to attract 
supporters. The analysis is conducted in relation to the cycle of electoral policy. 
In this context, this study aims to identify what changes the political reforms of 
the Abe era brought about and how they are related to the process of derivation 
and strengthening of the conservative shift in each area of government, party, 
and social constituency.
Details of the analysis are as follows. First, the study aims to clarify the 
change of policy positions proposed by the LDP in the input process. Then, the 
study clarifies the political differences among parties focusing on the change of 
the relationship between each party and its voters. Next, the study conducts an 
examination at the three levels of government, party, and social constituency in 
the output process. The examination clearly reveals that the structural change in 
policy decisions is the key mechanism to strengthen the conservative shift at the 
level of the government and the party. This paper will then observe whether 
there was a change in response strategies for general voters and support groups. 
The observation helps to see how the Abe-LDP promotes partisan realignment 
for the conservative shift. In addition, the paper discusses how Abe’s political 
reforms in each area are related to the derivation and strengthening of the 
conservative shift. Then, the study explains the mechanism of the conservative 
shift led by the political forces. Based on the results of this analysis, the 
conclusion suggests present implications of this study in relation to the 
structural changes of the Japanese political process.
The Input Process of the Conservative Political Shift: The 
Spatiotemporal Shift of Reforms and Strategic Validity
What was the reason for the conservative political reforms in the Abe era? To 
institutionalist perspective, which focuses on how institutional changes define actors, has been the 
dominant idea. On the other hand, a socio-economic perspective addresses not only institutional 
changes, but also the socio-economic factors that caused them (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). A 
structural perspective pays attention to the dynamics of political institutions (Estevez-Abe 2008) 
describing Japanese politics, which is changing from a consensus to a majoritarian type.  
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answer the question, it is necessary to see the process of comprehensive social 
reform that focuses on the departure from the postwar regime. The following 
will analyze inter-party policy competitions, voting strategies, and intra-party 
policymaking process. 
1.  A Competition between Parties and a Differentiating Strategy for Policy 
Position: The Spatial Shift of Reform 
The first important aspect to derive the frame of conservative reform is the 
relation to the inter-party competition. Since the 1990s, the core of Japanese 
political reform has been to establish a system capable of power transition 
centered on policy competition between political parties. It was realized in the 
mid-2000s. Since then, the policy position between parties regarding the 
direction of future reforms has changed. As shown in figure 2, the reaction to 
the Koizumi administration, which promoted neoliberal structural reforms 
(economic and social C), contributed to the transfer of power to the DPJ. The 
DPJ created policies for a new welfare state and the East Asia community 
(foreign affairs and security B, economic and social B). The change of government 
policy, along with trial and error, followed the power transition. During the 
transition, the LDP changed their existing policy position, placing the party as the 
opposite to the DPJ government. 
Since December 2012, Abe-LDP has promoted discourse and policy 
directions against the DPJ. Regarding foreign affairs and security, Abe-LDP 
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Figure 2. Policy Positions on Domain Space
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emphasized national security, relations with the US, and military realism 
(foreign affairs and security D). Regarding the economic and social area, Abe-
LDP emphasized traditional values and community along with growth 
(economic and social D). First, in terms of foreign affairs and security, the 
strategy of Abe-LDP concentrates on active pacifism and military normalization 
through constitutional revision. This reflects the expectation of the regional 
security provision by the US. It will strengthen international cooperation, 
cooperation with the US, and the US-Japan alliance. In other words, the strategy 
of Abe-LDP aims to strengthen Japan’s independent defense capability through 
military normalization. The economic and social strategy was formed by the 
combination of neoliberalism and nationalism. The strategy inherited the 
neoliberal approach of the Koizumi administration in that it emphasizes small 
government, economic reform based on free competition, and growth. 
However, the strategy is distinct because it considers social dynamics that 
promote the growth for a revival of a strong nation. The social dynamics include 
Japanese tradition, culture, and a strong bond among family, regional 
community, and state. “Toward a beautiful country, Japan” and “a strong nation, 
Japan” are the catchphrases of the Abe administration and reveal that Abe’s 
socio-cultural values reflect nationalist attitudes similar to those of traditional 
conservatives.
Abe-LDP remade its policy position on the premise of political reform that 
does not return to old LDP politics (Domain A). Currently, the LDP moved to a 
completely different policy zone. It is different from the DPJ and even previous 
governments that led reforms. This shows a strategic validity of the LDP policy, 
which successfully returned to power. The LDP placed itself at a point that 
satisfies both the need to continue to replace the existing Japanese system and 
the national demand for a new political and ideological vision. 
2.  Strategy for Voters and Linkage Choice: Temporal Shift of Reform 
Since the political restructuring in the 1990s, the LDP promoted administrative, 
economic, and social reforms. As figure 3 suggests, the Hashimoto Ryūtarō 
administration at the end of the 1990s focused on administrative reform. It 
hastened to improve institutions to strengthen the leadership of the prime 
minister and cabinet. In the early 2000s, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō 
shifted its priority to economic reform. Through these reforms, the neoliberal 
economic structure has been strengthened, deviating from the existing policy 
stance of protecting local and domestic industries. On the other hand, the 
second Abe administration that came into office in December 2012 focused on 
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revitalizing national identity and enhancing competitiveness. These are core 
mechanisms that encompass economics, foreign affairs, and society. 
Throughout the process, the Abe administration followed the neoliberal 
economic reforms of the Koizumi administration. Meantime, the Abe 
administration prioritizes the “social reforms” that emphasize conservative 
ideology.   
This kind of reform is related to the LDP’s strategy for party-voter linkage.3 
3. See Kitschelt (2007, 1-49) for the diversity of party (politician)-voter linkage and strategic choice 
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See Budge (1987) for specific coding method. See Mair (1987) and Lee Jukyung 
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Figure 3. The LDP’s Election Pledges for the House of Representatives and Changes in 
Policy Priority 
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This is because of the socio-economic environment surrounding Japanese 
politics, such as the recession, the change of industrial structure, and 
globalization. The LDP paid a high political price to maintain clientel linkage, 
and the change of environment made this difficult. The LDP-voter relationship 
based on profit-driven politics that exchanges votes for profits corresponds to a 
typical clientel linkage.4 Along with local grants and public works, the subsidies 
and financial policies for backward domestic industries, such as agriculture, 
commerce, and small and medium-sized enterprises, created a process of 
exchanging votes and profits that lasted for a long time. In addition, there was a 
decentralized organization structure and autonomy over budget and financial 
operations. Moreover, the LDP could monopolize government resources 
because the party ruled the government for so long. This resulted in an 
extended period of clientel linkage. However, a coalition government has 
emerged since the 1990s, and the budget decreased due to the economic 
recession. The sense of deprivation prevailing among urban voters fostered the 
atmosphere of anti-clientelism. These factors made it hard for the LDP to 
maintain the existing clientel network, which involved a high political cost. (Lee 
Jukyung 2016a, 216).  
The LDP had to consider changing the relationship between the party and 
of political parties. 
4. The relationship between a political party (politician) and voters vary depending on the type of 
benefit the politician distribute to whom he gets supports. For example, local grants and public 
works projects that give beneficiaries to specific areas, or subsidies and financing policies to 
specific industries are typical clientelistic linkage. On the other hand, non-exclusive policies of 
security, macroeconomic growth, full employment, and environments benefit the whole nation 
This kind of ideological and normative policies are programmatic linkage (Kitschelt 2007, 10-11).
Table 1. The LDP’s Type of Reforms and the Strategy for Voter Linkage Choice 
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voters. To establish a new linkage and target, the LDP came up with reform 
strategies according to each period. As summarized in table 1, the Hashimoto 
administration attempted to eradicate clientelism. It set up an institution to 
implement linkage through administrative reform. During the Koizumi 
administration, there was a transitional risk, due to the removal of clientelism. 
The Koizumi administration tried to overcome this risk through a direct linkage 
with the majority of the public. The neoliberal economic reform carried out 
during this period helped the administration overcome this issue. On the other 
hand, the Abe administration began a social reform based on conservatism. 
This reform took place during the removal process of clientelism. The reform 
was a strategy to establish concrete support to prevent voters from abandoning 
the party (Lee Jukyung 2016a, 219-26). During the transition to the alternative 
linkage system, the LDP established an institution for its implementation. Then, 
the LDP formed a direct linkage with the majority of the public. The social 
reform under the Abe administration suggests that the LDP has developed a 
new linkage system based on ideology.  
3.  The Process of Establishing the Social Reform for the Conservative Shift 
within a Party
The goal of social reform in the Abe era is to respond to domestic and inter- 
national challenges by promoting social cohesion through the centripetal forces 
of national values and competitiveness. This is a prepared reform project of the 
LDP. The LDP seeks to extend the direction of political reform by strengthening 
the forces driving policy through cohesiveness and social unity. The direction of 
political reform extends not only towards the level of government-party, but 
also towards the level of society (voters).  
Party reform already began in 2005. In November of that year, the LDP 
finalized a new “ideology” and a “party platform” led by Abe (acting secretary-
general) on the 50th-anniversary party convention. The statement says, “We are 
committed to the safety of the country and our own safety. We respect the 
tradition and culture of Japan and promote their prosperity” (Jiyū Minshutō 
2005a). In addition, the platform stipulates “the establishment of a new 
constitution” and says that the country should “foster Japanese people to 
become strong-willed people” (Jiyū Minshutō 2005b). 
On the other hand, when Abe retired as prime minister in September 2007, 
improvements for both organization and policy took place. Regarding the 
reform for the party organization, the LDP realized that electoral volatility 
derived from the independent voters. This support came from the neoliberal 
12  LEE Jukyung
reform, which was inherited from the Koizumi administration. Thus, the LDP 
attempted to reestablish the social constituency by emphasizing the unique 
ideology of the LDP’s social conservatism (Nakakita 2014, 221-25). The LDP 
started to focus on revising the policy platform of the party. The LDP became 
the opposition party in 2009, and this escalated the desperate need to establish a 
new ideology to regain power. As a result, “A Meeting to Plan for a New 
Government” began that aimed to build a specific political ideology and policy 
system. By 2010, the LDP officially announced the new platform. 
The new party platform, promulgated in 2010, could be considered an 
extension of the platform announced in 2005. The new party platform 
strengthened the conservative characteristics of the previous platform by clearly 
explaining the “Japanese conservatism (Nihon rashii hoshushugi) which focused 
on the aspect of bonding (kizuna)” (Jiyū Minshutō 2010). In other words, the 
LDP created a platform that coordinated their conservative ideology. There was 
a strong demand inside of the LDP to intensify confrontation with the DPJ by 
reaffirming themselves as a conservative party. This suggests that the LDP 
expanded ideological conservatism to become the party’s core ideology. The 
LDP has done this by linking ideological conservatism with party reforms 
during the period in which they were the opposition party. 
In 2011, the party platform emerged as a specific policy rather than a mere 
ideology. The Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 was the turning point. After 
the disaster, the LDP issued a collection of policies entitled “The Eight Key 
Policies for the Reconstruction of Japan.” The collection included the LDP’s 
stance on eight areas: disasters, provinces, economy, the future, agriculture, 
education, territory, and Japan (Jiyū Minshutō 2011). In addition, Japan’s 
reconstruction, centered on ties with families, communities, and nations, was an 
encompassing logic linking important individual policies. It represented the 
compatibility of the conservative reforms with social reconstruction and 
revitalization. Moreover, it showed that ideological conservatism had been 
embodied in the policy. In particular, social reconstruction and revitalization 
was linked to national risk management through the so-called national 
resilience (kokudo kyōjinka). The social reconstruction and revitalization have 
led to the resumption of local public projects. As I will discuss later, they 
promoted foreign and domestic policies undergirding the conservative reforms, 
which aimed to combine (1) the traditional conservative power of the LDP, 
deriving from pork barrel politics, and (2) the neoconservative powers who 
support the normalization of Japan. 
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The Output of the Conservative Political Shift (1): Changes in 
Government-Ruling Party Policy Decision-Making and the 
Acceleration of Reform 
Japanese political reforms have pursued a unified policymaking strategy 
centered on the prime minister and political leaders. In particular, this tendency 
emphasized bonding and unity between the government and ruling party. It 
resulted in cabinet-led politics (Hashimoto administration), prime minister-led 
politics (Koizumi administration), and politician-led politics (administration 
under DPJ). Finally, the Abe administration structured the prime minister’s 
office-led politics. Based on this framework, the Abe administration is 
accelerating the implementation of conservative reforms to see their effects. The 
following sections discuss how the government and party have changed their 
policymaking and analyze what mechanisms led the conservative shift.
1.  Government Level: From the Policy Council System to the Council of 
Policy Advisers System
The prime minister’s office-led politics is a central characteristic of the Abe era. 
The term indicates that a few decision makers around the prime minister 
determine the main actors and decision-making method for the government. 
This change has occurred when Abe entered office.5
The Abe administration led three distinct changes in decision-making. Frist, 
the existing policy council (shingikai) system that is highly influenced by 
bureaucrats and policy specialists (zoku giin) is fading. Instead, a number of 
Council of Policy Advisers (CPA) under the names of specific headquarters 
(honbu) and meetings (kaigi) are increasing. The CPA is an extended version of 
the prime minister’s private advisory council. External professionals (yūshikisha) 
can be freely involved with the meetings and government bureaucrats related to 
each policy meeting have a difficult time responding systemically. This is similar 
to the private advisory councils of previous prime ministers, such as the 
Secondary ad-hoc Commission on Administrative Reform of the Nakasone 
Administration and the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy of the Koizumi 
5. Based on the interviews from the previous prime ministers, Machidori (2015, 29) found that 
prime ministers from the LDP used to strongly connect with LDP diet members since 1955. 
However, he adds that, currently, the prime minister is in close contact with chief cabinet secretary 
and other cabinet members. This means that the prime minister has strengthened his leadership 
role within a narrow network around him, resulting a change of decision-making by the 
government and ruling party.
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administration. Figure 4 shows the increasing trend of the number of CPA in 
each administration. The prime minister’s policymaking power has increased 
since 2000. After 2000, the number of CPA has been increasing, even during the 
period of power transition between the LDP and the DPJ. This suggests that 
Japanese political reforms that centered decision-making around the cabinet, 
prime minister, and politicians were the forerunners to the prime minister’s 
office-led politics during the Abe era.  
Second, there was a qualitative expansion of CPA. Considering that the 
quantitative increase of the CPA over the last thiry years is an extension of 
reform, the qualitative expansion is related to the government performance. In 
other words, since the second Abe cabinet, the policy meeting became a key 
mechanism for determining the main policies of the government. A decision by 
either the cabinet or the prime minister can organize a policy meeting. Indeed, 
the Abe administration actively uses the prime minister’s discretion to organize 
CPA, especially for matters in which the government and the ruling party have 
hard time reaching a consensus. As a result, decision making and policy 
implementation are accelerating by excluding the discordance among other 
actors.6 
6. For example, in the process of changing the interpretation of the constitution regarding the right 
Source: Recomposed the data from Nonaka and Aoki (2016, 77-78).
Figure 4. Number of Council of Policy Advisers from Previous Administrations 
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Third, the policy preference of the prime minister and his inner circle is 
strongly reflected in the major issues of the government. Unlike the existing 
policy council system, the CPA is composed of the prime minister, his inner 
circle politicians, bureaucrats, and experts from outside. The policy meeting 
system has flexible foundation, objective, and membership. In addition, rather 
than a forum for discussion among members, it has a structure that easily 
reflects the preference of the prime minister. Due to the presence of the prime 
minister and cabinet ministers at the meeting, the meeting is under approval of 
the prime minister (Nonaka and Aoki 2016, 110-26). In addition, the government 
has established a management system for bureaucrats called Cabinet Personnel 
Management Agency (Naikaku Jinjikyoku) in 2014. Along with CPA, this agency 
indirectly supports the decision-making powers for the prime minister’s office.7  
On the other hand, the Clean Government Party (CGP), a ruling coalition 
party also responsible for the administration, has limited influence in decision-
making. The coalition between the LDP and the CGP builds electoral cooperation 
and the coalition critically influences the electoral process. In addition, the LDP-
CGP coalition has been consolidated for budget and legislation proposals in the 
National Diet, the nomination and adjustment of candidates, and cooperation in 
elections.8 However, it is difficult to deny the dominance of Abe-LDP based on 
their policy planning ability and the leadership in the administration. The prime 
minister and his cabinet currently decide the direction of policies, and a policy 
discussion body between the ruling parties is weak compared to the power of 
the prime minister and his cabinet.9 Thus, the influence of the CGP is limited. 
of collective self-defense, the first Abe administration reassigned the “Council for security 
legislation” and made decision based upon the reports from the meeting. During the process, Abe 
replaced director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, who was hesitant in changing the 
interpretation of the constitution, with a diplomat who was an active supporter for changing the 
interpretation (Sindō 2015, 324).  
7. The Abe administration wanted to establish the Cabinet Personnel Management Agency for the 
personnel management of high-level government officials. The administration wanted to operate a 
government led by politics. The related draft passed the cabinet decision in 2013. Finally, a piece of 
legislation called the “Amendment Act of the National Civil Servants Act,” was passed by the 
National Diet in 2014, establishing an affiliated organization under Cabinet Secretariat on May 30.  
8. The coalition between the LDP and the CGP was possible because of their shared interests, 
including single-member districts. The LDP had an interest in electoral districts that have one or 
two members for the House of Councilors, and the CGP wanted to participate in a coalition 
cabinet. These shared interests enabled the coalition between the two parties despite their political 
and ideological differences (Kim Yong-bok 2015, 283). 
9. Japan has had a coalition government since the 1990s. However, in the present coalition 
government by the LDP and the CGP, a policy discussion body among the government and ruling 
parties is not central to government policy decisions. Instead, bureaucrats from each department 
consult with each party (nemawashi). This kind of intermediation between departments of the 
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Since the second Abe cabinet, the CGP has conceded on the Act on the 
Protection of Specially Designated Secrets and collective self-defense right. The 
CGP promoted cooperation in the economic and social areas, including the tax 
reduction rate that is directly linked to elections. In other words, the CGP was 
expected to slow down the policies of the conservative shift.10 However, the LDP 
and the CGP respect mutual autonomy and prefer to emphasize agreements 
between the parties to maintain the coalition government.11 Indeed, the CGP 
incorporated its own electoral cooperation with the LDP into the power of the 
LDP. This helped the CGP participate in individual policies of social welfare and 
education as a coalition party. The CGP also enjoys the benefits that come from 
a ruling coalition, including influence over bureaucratic organizations and 
drafts of legislation.12   
2.  Party Level: Use of the Preliminary Review System Centered on Special 
Offices under the President
The prime minister’s office-led system reflects the preferences and leadership of 
the prime minister in making policy decisions. The cabinet’s high approval rate 
and successive election victories further support the system. In the LDP, which 
returned to the power after three years in the general election of 2012, it is 
difficult to raise a counter-argument against the Abe administration’s operation 
of the government. Indeed, this difficulty has helped the prime minister’s office-
led politics persist. However, there are also structural changes in the intra-party 
space that support the prime ministerial power. These changes are similar to the 
government and parties plays a major role in cabinet decisions (interview with the cabinet office 
bureaucracy January 30, 2016).
10. Since the Seiwa Political Analysis Council (Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyūkai) began to overwhelm the 
LDP in the 2000s, the hawkish tendency in security policy and education policy was strengthened. 
In particular, as the advocates for constitutional revision strengthened their voices, the policy gap 
between the two parties grew. With the establishment of the second Abe cabinet, the LDP and the 
CGP announced the issues they both agreed to support. Although there was no problem in 
economic policy, such as setting an inflation rate target of two percent, it was difficult to reach 
consensus on policies such as revision of the constitution and nuclear power plants. As Abe asked 
to cooperate with the conservative right-wing policy, the CGP now confronts conflicts internally 
about the party’s policy line (Yakushiji 2016, 226-29).   
11. The CGP has opposed the collective self-defense rights since the establishment of the party. 
Now, the party is forced to seriously consider whether to maintain its existing stance, which would 
destroy the coalition, or to maintain the coalition through compromise. The LDP and the CGP 
have started discussing the issue from the end of 2013. Consequently, they compromised to save 
the coalition and the CGP added three conditions (Yakushiji 2016, 9-10). 
12. Interview with officials from the CGP, August 10, 2017.
  Neoconservative Political Reform  17
government’s policy decision-making process.
It is imperative to pay attention to the intraparty decision-making process as 
the government and the ruling party formulate a policy. The decentralized, 
parallel decision-making system of LDP under the 1955 system includes 
factions, the Policy Affairs Research Council (Seimu Chōsakai), and policy 
specialists. The system has been the target of political reform in Japan, and the 
LDP has concentrated on building a more centralized decision-making system. 
Watching the intra-party divisions under the DPJ administration was a learning 
experience for the LDP. The LDP saw that political unity and cohesion within the 
party must be secured to sustain the political power. 
The Abe era depicts distinct changes even in the intra-party policy making 
process. Most importantly, the policy preference of the prime minister strongly 
determines the party’s policy direction. Abe’s power and discretion have greatly 
increased after political party-oriented voting became an important factor in 
choosing a government.   
Two of the most complicated decisions for the party were TPP participation, 
which is the party’s core policy for economic and trade policies, and the issue of 
collective self-defense rights, which is the core policy for foreign affairs and 
security. After returning to power in December 2012, Abe made his first 
decision to participate in TPP. At the time of the general election in 2012, the 
LDP was cautious toward TPP. More than a half of the LDP diet members 
supported this stance. However, the party made an official decision to participate 
in TPP in March 2013, only one month after the party’s discussions had begun 
(Lee Jukyung 2016b, 102-105). There was a similar process regarding collective 
self-defense. In 2014, the cautious approach toward collective self-defense rights 
was dominant in the General Council (Sōmu Kondankai) and Policy Research 
Council. However, the establishment in March of the “Headquarters for 
Promoting the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security” (Anzen 
Hōshō Hōsei Seibi Suishin Honbu), a special office under the president, changed 
the forum of discussion. Consequently, it also changed the direction of 
discussion and the party decision. 
Regarding the change in decision-making, it is important to understand the 
qualitative change of the preliminary review system (jizen shinsasei) that used to 
secure the unity of the LDP. Under the preliminary review system, each policy 
goes through an intra-party preliminary adjustment process in the subcommittees 
and committees under the Policy Affairs Research Council. Then the Executive 
Council (Sōmukai) finally approves the resolution through consensus agreement. 
It is a bottom-up decision-making system that binds the LDP politicians to the 
party discipline (tōgi kōsoku). Shown in the postal privatization case in 2005, the 
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Koizumi administration tried to exclude the restriction of the intra-party 
preliminary review system. Unlike the Koizumi administration, the Abe 
administration actively uses the preliminary review system for compulsory 
adherence to a party decision. This is a stark contrast between the two 
administrations.
However, it is difficult to see this as parallel, bottom-up decision-making 
centered on existing policy specialists. An official party decision still has to go 
through the Policy Affairs Research Council and the final resolution of the 
Executive Council to have binding power. However, offices under the direct 
supervision of the prime minister replaced the Policy Affairs Research Council 
for the virtual discussion forum. As a result, discussions in subcommittees of 
the Policy Affairs Research Council became limited. On the other hand, the 
number of offices under the direct supervision of the prime minister, which was 
only four during the first Abe cabinet, increased to twenty-one. These offices are 
linked with CPA at the prime minister’s office and cabinet office, which were 
the important changes in the Abe administration. The link implies that this is a 
key mechanism for the unity of the government/ruling party and cohesion 
within the party (table 2). 
The prime minister’s office-led politics during the Abe era is far from a 
bottom-up, deliberative politics in that it has a closed policy decision-making 
process that limits discussions within the party. Instead, it increased the power 
of the prime minister’s office and cabinet office. On the other hand, it achieved 
the unity of the government and ruling party, which had been a challenge of 
Japanese political reform both in Koizumi’s prime minister-led politics and the 
DPJ’s politician-led politics. As shown in the diagram in figure 5, there has been 
a systematization of CPA as the number of important CPA increased. The 
example of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy under the Koizumi 
administration was the prototype of the basic policy formation process (domain 
A). In addition, the operation of the National Strategic Council during the DPJ 
administration materialized the so-called PDCA (Plan→Do→Check→Act) cycle, 
which was a frame for the policy evaluation and amendment process (Domain 
B).13
In domain A, which determines the direction of the policy, the Abe 
13. In process A, the policy meeting decides the basic direction of the policy. Based on the meeting, 
each department in the government carries out the legislative process, and the cabinet submits the 
decision to the National Diet. In process B, a meeting is held to announce the policy or check its 
effectiveness. The meeting confirms the implementation status of each area. This is different from 
the Koizumi administration in terms of confirming the legislation at the policy meeting before 
submission to the National Diet and evaluating the result of the legislation after the bill has passed. 
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Table 2. A List of Special Offices under the President and Their Tasks
Names of Special Offices under the President Tasks in Detail
Headquarters for National Vision Project Medium- and long-term policy 
making
Headquarters for Promoting Administrative Reform Reform for civil service system
Headquarters for North Korean Abductions The problem of abductions
Headquarters for Party and Political System Reform 
Implementation
Reform for national diet and party 
principle
Headquarters for Promoting the “Doshūsei” 
Regional System
Adjustment with six of regional 
bodies
Headquarters for the Promotion of Revision of the 
Constitution
Revision for the national referendum
Headquarters for Accelerating Reconstruction after 
the Great East Japan Earthquake
Proposing policies for revitalization
Headquarters for Electoral System Reform Decreasing the number of diet 
members
Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization Escape from deflation
Headquarters for the Revitalization of Education Reform for education
Strategic Council on Diplomacy Setting keynote in foreign affairs
Headquarters for Regional Diplomatic and 
Economic Partnership
Response to TPP
Headquarters for the Action Committee for the 
Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games
Preparation for Tokyo Olympics
Headquarters for Creating Attractive Cities and 
Regions
Policy measures for local regions
Headquarters on Creation of Regional Vitality in 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
Agricultural revitalization
Headquarters for Implementing National 
Campaigns to Cheer up Japan
Escalation of the increase in income
Headquarters for Overcoming Population Decline 
and Regional Revitalization
Regional revitalization
Headquarters for Promoting Women’s Active 
Participation
Promoting women’s active 
participation
Headquarters for Promoting Dynamic Engagement 
of All Citizens
Policy measures for low fertility rate 
and aging
Headquarters for the Revitalization of Education Reviewing reform of education
Headquarters for Promoting the Development of 
Legislation for Peace and Security
Promoting the security legislation
Source:  Compiled by the author referring to Asahi shinbun [Asahi Newspaper] (as of September 
15, 2013) and special offices created after the date.
20  LEE Jukyung
administration uses the special offices under the president and preliminary 
review system to restrict the intra-party debate. This eliminates the influence of 
opponents within the party. Checks and adjustments take place in domain B. 
The Abe administration emphasizes the role of policy specialists and subcom- 
mittees of Policy Affairs Research Council that provide detailed measures. In 
other words, the Abe administration applied the logic of exclusion in the policy 
development process and the logic of inclusion in the modification process. It 
shifted the role of policy specialists from focusing on political responsiveness to 
explanation of policies and political accountability.14 This was derived from the 
intra-party governance strategy of the Abe era to minimize the divisions and 
oppositions within the party, which had been challenges for the Koizumi and 
14. A typical example is the political process of TPP negotiations. In March 2013, the Abe 
administration excluded the opponents in the party to reach an agreement. Instead, the 
Headquarters for TPP (policy meeting) and special offices under the LDP president related to 
foreign affairs and economics swiftly led the agreement for participation in TPP. Then, the 
Headquarters for TPP, under government control, led the negotiation process and information 
provisions. By contrast, the Agriculture and Forestry Committee of the LDP rose after the TPP 
negotiation in October 2015. The Committee presented the framework for countermeasures. The 
Abe administration adopted a conciliatory policy of accepting the opinions of agricultural 
community by appointing Moriyama Hiroshi, who advocated for the agricultural community to 
take a cautious stance toward the TPP, as the Minister of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries to 
deal with policy measures (Lee Jukyung 2016b).  





















Reach an agreement in the party: 
led by organs under direct supervision 
of the prime minister
Involvement of the ruling party:
extending roles of committees and 
subcommittees 
  Neoconservative Political Reform  21
DPJ administrations. The strategy organized a way of reaching intra-party 
agreement through CPA linkage. As a result, prime minister’s office-led politics 
was established in the Abe era, and it supports the unity of government and the 
ruling party. 
The Output Process of the Conservative Political Shift (2): 
Specification of Partisan Realignment
These continuous reforms resulted in the prime minister’s office-led politics. 
Based on the decisions made under this system, the Abe administration 
appealed to the general electorate the superior ability of operating the 
government. It distinguished itself from the DPJ administration. In fact, in 
recent research on the results of the Lower House elections in 2017, more than 
half of the voters highly approved of the ability of the Abe cabinet. This shows 
that the LDP’s execution of policy and government operation has greatly 
improved (Yi I-bŏm 2017). At the same time, the Abe administration is 
launching a two-sided strategy. It is asserting reforms by promoting messages 
such as the departure from the postwar regime, Japan as a strong nation, and 
Japan’s revitalization. On the other hand, the Abe administration also embraces 
ideological conservatives. This study analyzes the change in response to the 
general electorate and support groups (subordinate organizations and party 
members). Based on this observation, this study clarifies the strategy of partisan 
realignment for the conservative shift in the Abe era. 
1. Strategy for the General Electorate 
The Abe administration devised a survival strategy to structure fluid voter 
support by applying ideological and normative principles of conservatism. It is a 
strategy to pursue neoliberal reforms that emphasize market principles, gain 
support from independent voters, and establish grassroots conservatism by 
explicitly advocating constitutional revision (Nakakita 2012, 157-58). However, 
the political preference of the electorate and these key policies of the Abe era are 
not consistent. Figure 6 shows that, since the late 1990s, the electorate has been 
interested in social welfare issues, such as economic measures, medical care, 
pension, and aging society measures. By contrast, the security legislation and 
constitutional revision which are classified as major policies of the Abe 
administration are not a priority of the electorate.15 
15. Meanwhile, there was support for the LDP and conservative thinking in the results of the 
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Thus, Prime Minister Abe focused on the establishment of an economic 
policy, considering this as his weakness point during the first Abe cabinet, and 
proposed Abenomics. Abenomics aims to escape from deflation and economic 
growth through quantitative easing. Specifically, the policy seeks to eliminate 
conflicts in the neoliberal reforms by making fiscal mobilization and the growth 
strategy compatible. This helps to prevent factors that impede social conservatives 
from uniting. It is still controversial whether Abenomics will transform the 
country’s economic structure by stimulating the economy and whether growth 
and welfare can be compatible. However, it is noteworthy that this policy was 
Lower House elections in October 2017. Prime Minister Abe defined the dissolution of the Lower 
House as “The election settled down the national crisis”. In addition, the threat of North Korea also 
played a major role. The great victory of LDP can be interpreted as implying that there are many 
voters who agree with the perception and explanation of Prime Minister Abe. It also suggests that 
the conservative party, the LDP, is likely to win in the future in the face of the security crisis (Yi 
Myŏn-u 2017, 11).  
Note:  Allowed only voter responses, including multiple responses.Included the top six 
categories.
Source:  Compiled by the author based on annual research of “Requests to Government” 
by Cabinet Office. The chart focused on the election period for the House of 
Representatives.
Figure 6. Tendency of Requests to Government (%)
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effective in responding to voters who were disappointed with the performance of 
the DPJ. The policy addressed the expectations of voters who were sensitive about 
the recovery of the economy. As the analysis of the recent election and voting 
behavior revealed, the opposition party’s standing on the issue has weakened. At 
the electorate level, expectations for the competitiveness and recovery of the 
Japanese economy and the policy’s approach to settling the increasing stock rate 
created a favorable environment for the LDP (Maeda and Hirano 2015).  
In addition, the new economic and social system proposed by Prime 
Minister Abe aims to build a society based on the efforts of individuals and local 
communities. In other words, by emphasizing the external pressure from the 
international community, the nationalistic values of enhancing the status and 
competitiveness of the nation have become the centripetal force. It is well 
known that this has sealed off social opposition and led to the self-transformation 
of inefficient sectors. There is no doubt that Abe’s strategy to promote ideology 
is most visible in the fields of foreign affairs and security.16 Nevertheless, even 
regarding major social issues such as employment, low fertility, aging, local 
revitalization, women’s activities, and educational reform, nationalistic values 
are embedded. In addition, the direction and implementation of individual 
policies and the distribution of public goods all include nationalistic values. 
2. Strategy for Support Groups 
In the Abe era, the LDP has promoted three main strategies for support groups. 
First, the LDP strengthened local organizations and secured party members. 
The existence of strong local organizations is one of the LDP’s strengths. These 
local organizations overwhelm the other parties.17 Thus, the LDP is planning to 
enhance the party by focusing on these groups. The party emphasizes local 
governments to vitalize the party and secure the party members. For example, 
the LDP started a campaign called “Securing 1.2 Million Party Members.” The 
16. In December 2013, a secret protection bill was established. In July 2014, the cabinet decision 
(kakugi) to exercise the collective self-defense right was made. In 2015, the Security Legislation 
(Anzen Hōshō Hōsei) was revised. Along with these examples, the expression of strong willingness 
for constitutional revision prior to the Lower House election in 2017 is another example.  
17. According to a survey by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, there are 1,338 
LDP Diet members out of 2,675 in the National Diet since the local election in 2015, or 50.5 
percent. The DPJ, at second place, has 11.6 percent (Sōmushō Jichi Gyōseikyoku Senkyobu 2015, 
10). There is no doubt that the local assembly acted as a stronghold for the LDP. In addition, the 
number of seats varies greatly at the national level, depending on political reforms and current 
pending issues, but the local assembly does not get a lot of influence from the political realignment 
and political reform (Tsuji 2008). 
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LDP sets the target number of party members for individual central-local 
politicians.18 It is important to secure the party members because it is directly 
related to strengthening the personal support organizations (kōenkai), which 
have weakened. Even after adopting the Single Member District (SMD) system, 
personal support organizations by individuals still play a major role in the LDP-
voters linkage. In fact, there is a problem caused by the specificity of the 
composition of personal support organizations. These organizations are based 
on an old network of regional representatives, industries, and associations. This 
network is far from an ideological organization. Thus, it is not easy to make a 
structural transition from the election campaigns that try to garner support 
from personal support organizations based on nonpartisan regional networks.    
Second, the LDP is attempting to change the operating principles of local 
organizations in a way that reinforces ideological conservatism. There are two 
types of LDP members. One is the neoconservatives who pursue normalization 
for Japan. The others are the traditional conservatives stemming from pork 
barrel politics. According to an attitude survey by the Asahi newspaper (Asahi 
shinbun) of LDP members, the neoconservatives were positive in their 
evaluation of the Abe cabinet and constitutional revision. On the other hand, 
traditional conservatives tended to be negative or show reservations.19 This 
implies that even if the partisan realignment coping strategy in the Abe era is 
intended to foster grassroots conservatives, there is a gap at the support level. 
The gap exists between traditional conservatives and neoconservatives who 
support the normalization of the nation. It is caused by the different policy 
preferences and values of the groups. In this regard, it is important to see the 
LDP’s response to the local organizations in 2015. The LDP, which had been 
pursuing the security legislation, held two or three open lectures for the 
18. The National Diet members set a goal of securing 1,000 members each. The local assembly 
members set a goal of securing 100 to 500 members, depending on their local organizations and 
the number of elections they won. The achievement rate differs from region to region, but it is 
higher in the traditional conservative region in the rural area (Interview with officials from the 
Prefectural Federation of LDP Branches, September 28, 2015).   
19. According to the survey that asked about admiring politicians, each politician took up 
following percentages: nineteen percent for Abe, seventeen percent for Koizumi, and six percent 
for Tanaka Kakuei. There is also a question asking whether the LDP currently reflects the opinions 
of party members to party operation and policies. Twenty-eight percent answered “yes” while 
fifty-four percent answered “no” to the question. For a question asking whether the constitutional 
revision should take place swiftly, thirty-four percent answered that it should be implemented 
swiftly while fifty-seven percent answered there is no need for haste. For a question related to 
amending Article 9 of the Constitution, forty-three percent answered it should not be revised, 
ahead of thirty-seven percent that answered it should be revised (Asahi shinbun, November 30, 
2015).      
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Prefectural Federation of LDP Branches (Todōfuken Shibu Rengōkai) to explain 
the purpose and direction of the policy.20 During the time, most of the LDP 
members in rural areas were highly interested in the TPP negotiations and the 
implications for agriculture. Despite the high level of interest, the policy 
explanation by the party tried to prompt self-help for economic issues while 
asking for support and understanding about the Abe administration’s foreign 
affairs and security policies. This indicates the subordinate organizations of the 
Abe administration attempted to enhance the cohesion among party members 
through ideological linkage. 
Third, the LDP is preparing for the era of post-clientelism by promoting 
social groups who support strengthening efforts towards the normalization of 
Japan. This could be a supplementary mechanism for the existing business-
oriented voting organizations. After the election of the House of Councilors in 
2013, groups supporting vocational representation has strengthened the 
relationship with the LDP again. In addition, the Abe administration, which 
places importance on the relationship with support groups, restored its 
relationship with fixed support groups, such as the postal service, construction 
industry, and the Japan Association of Medical Practitioners. However, the 
vocational representation system with links to clientelism, which exercises the 
power of aggregated votes from organized interest groups at a national level, is 
declining. In contrast, the most prominent supporters at present for the LDP are 
some conservative religious groups, such as the Shinto Political League (Shintō 
Seiji Renmei), Association of Shinto Shrines (Shintō Honchō), Society of Friends 
of the Spirits (Reiyukai), Bussho Gonenkai Kyōdan, a Buddhist Organization 
Practicing the Lotus Sutra, and Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi), which is 
related to former groups.21 In addition to the diversification and emergence of 
opposing media, right-wing individuals, who used to be a minority in Japanese 
society, are raising their voices. Many LDP politicians, including Prime Minister 
Abe, eagerly make use of their impact.22
20. An interview with an official from the Prefectural Federation of LDP Branches, September. 28, 
2015.
21. Studies by Sugano (2016), Aoki (2016), and Tawara (2016) are famous for examining the Japan 
Conference and Tsukada (2015, 2017) is famous for research on the relationship between 
conservative religious groups and politics.  
22. On the other hand, there are reservations about whether these people can replace the power of 
aggregated votes by a vocational representation system. There are also reservations about whether 
these people encourage the LDP to turn rightist. Even a candidate supported by the Shinto Political 
League, which exercises strong power to aggregate votes, does not get the 200,000 votes needed to 
enter the House of Councilors. Moreover, the power for aggregating votes is declining. There is an 
argument that the Japan Conference complies with the direction of the LDP, but the increasing 
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The LDP faced the challenge of restoring its support base that weakened 
since the Koizumi administration. The Abe era implemented specific measures 
for this recovery. The Abe administration is different from the Koizumi 
administration. The Koizumi administration sought to implement a neoliberal 
economy and defeat factional politics. Based on this premise, the Koizumi 
administration received support through the direct linkage with general voters. 
On the other hand, the Abe administration focused on its response to the 
weakened support base by restoring the traditional support for the LDP. It also 
attempted to build another base, which combines conservative social forces who 
support the normalization of Japan through ideological linkage (table 3). 
Abenomics includes aggressive financial easing, monetary support for public 
projects, and growth strategies with deregulation. This shows that the Abe 
administration is avoiding the contradiction of neoliberal reform which has 
troubled the LDP since the Koizumi administration. In addition, the Abe 
administration is increasing the budget for public works and land improvement. 
The traditional support base has an interest in local revitalization and public 
works examplified by the national resilience project. Indeed, the interest of the 
traditional support base is intertwined with social reforms that emphasize local 
organizations in the Abe era. 
influence of the Japan Conference does not promote the LDP to turn rightist (Nakakita 2017, 212).  
Table 3. Comparison between the Koizumi Administration and the Abe Administration
Koizumi LDP Abe LDP
Reform strategy Economic reform (structural 
reform)




Neoliberalism + Pork barrel politics




Prime minister-led Prime minister’s office-led
Governance in 
the party
Factions, excluding policy 
specialists
Destroying preliminary review 
system.
Factions, including policy 
specialists
Utilizing preliminary review system
Response to 
voters
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Political Reforms and Mechanism of the Conservative Political 
Shift
The conservative shift of the Abe era aligns with the structural changes in LDP 
politics. While political reforms have continued, Japanese politicians have tried 
various methods to direct them. Recently, they were combined with the coping 
strategies of Abe-LDP, which supported and even enhanced the conservative 
shift. In the following section, this study summarizes how the conservative shift 
is related to political reforms and its mechanisms in the Abe era.   
As shown in figure 7, the conservative shift was first derived in the process 
of inputting political reforms. A series of reforms towards anti-clientelism has 
continued since the 1990s. During this period, a social reform by the LDP, 
which is ideologically conservative, emerged as an alternative for establishing a 
new Japanese system. This occurred during the power transition between the 
LDP and the DPJ, and there were much competitions and trials and errors. The 
alternatives provided by the LDP distinguished itself with a counter-discourse to 
regain power and were effective electoral strategies. 
Moreover, the output process of political reform enhanced the conservative 
shift. The power of the prime minister’s office was strengthened as part of the 
political reform that promoted unity between the government and the ruling 
party. Based on this, there was a structural change in policy decision-making. A 
change in the policy process through the prime minister’s office currently leads 
the conservative shift. At the government level, CPA became routine. In the 
intra-party level, the special offices under the president are increasing their 
influence. These all show a structural characteristic of policymaking in the Abe 
era that is strongly bound with the policy preference of the prime minister and 
party leadership. 
The Koizumi administration and the DPJ administration had consistently 
pursued unified decision-making between the government and ruling party, for 
intensified policy conflicts among prominent leaders in the party make it 
difficult to showcase the government’s performance. As shown in the case of the 
TPP negotiation and security legislation, there were disputes between the prime 
minister’s office and the party even in Abe-LDP administration. However, the 
empirical learning effect, which taught them that conflicts within the party 
might hurt the government’s ability to operate, helped Prime Minister Abe to 
strengthen the intra-party cohesion for the challenges he faced regarding the 
conservative reforms. Abe also worked for inter-party governance that embraces 
policy specialists and subcommittees of the Policy Affairs Research Council. 
The governance transformed the role of policy specialists. As a result, it 
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simplified the decision-making process for conservative reform tasks and 
accelerated the policy implementation. 
The acceleration of policy implementation and the actualization of ongoing 
policies are deepening conservative tendencies. Nonetheless, the unity and 
cohesion between the government and the ruling party has consolidated the 
support base of the LDP. The image of the ruling party, which is different from 
that of the DPJ, enhances government performance. This helped the LDP return 
to the top. The reform strategy of the Abe era continuously sends the messages 
of conservative reform. It is becoming an effective measure to reconstruct the 
support-base of the LDP that has weakened since the Koizumi administration. 
The strategy strengthened as it linked with another neoconservative reform 
strategy that combines traditional conservatives and neoconservatives in the 
Abe era.23 
Conclusion and Implications: Prospects and Challenges of the 
Political Reform
This study examined the input and output process of the political reform by 
Abe-LDP at multiple levels of the Japanese political system, thereby highlighting 
the mechanism of reform towards the conservative shift during the Abe era. It 
analyzed the structural change of the LDP politics cycle at the levels of 
government, party, and social constituency. The study also found that the 
coping strategies of Abe-LDP linked the Japanese political reforms, which has 
persisted for a long time, with the conservative shift. Finally, it reached the 
conclusion that the response strategies of Abe-LDP are embedded in the 
structural changes of LDP politics.  
In the Abe era, the LDP succeeded in securing a stable majority in repeated 
national elections. This is partially due to the failure of the DPJ administration 
and the polarization of the opposition party. This created a favorable environment 
for the LDP, which has relatively more solid voter support. It was difficult to 
change this competitive advantage. The government performance, local 
organizations, local community, and relations with industry associations 
empower the LDP and this power overwhelms all other political forces. As a 
23. On the other hand, it is difficult to establish an ideological linkage in a short period of time. 
Thus, it is hasty to discuss the effects and achievements. Nevertheless, if the LDP continues this 
conservative reform strategy, it will pose a challenge for the post-Abe era. The challenge is how to 
combine the political values and the heterogeneity of the policy preferences of the traditional 
conservative forces and the neoconservatives who support the normalization of the nation.   
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result, the inter-party and intra-party effects are weakening the opposition, and 
Japanese politics is returning to the LDP dominant system. It is an ironic 
phenomenon because the system of one party dominance has been the target of 
reforms. In addition, the direction of the reforms is accelerating the conservative 
policies under the leadership of the prime minister’s office. 
This move by the LDP seems stable enough to maintain power in the short 
term. However, it includes factors that could possibly lead to a power transition. 
Japanese reform politics has shifted to the right, and the input and output 
structure of the Japanese political reforms have the following structural 
limitations. First, it became difficult for the LDP to suggest an alternative 
discourse that can absorb the general voters’ support in the future, as the policy 
flexibility of the LDP has narrowed. By focusing on strengthening unity and 
cohesion within the party, it became difficult to discuss the revision of existing 
policies and alternative discourses. The LDP failed to sustain administrations in 
the early 1990s and late 2000s. These cases show that the LDP’s ability to change 
policies narrowed when intra-party competition, which reflects public opinion, 
was reduced. Because this is an important factor for governmental change, the 
past egime-chang cycles are still present.
Second, there is a rigidity problem from the output process which happens 
during decision-making in the prime minister’s office-led politics. The rigidity of 
government policy in the Abe era has become more intense than any of the 
periods in the past. The relationship between the government and bureaucrats 
under the leadership of the prime minister’s office helps to make swift policy 
decisions and prepare for policy measures. Nevertheless, it extremely constrains 
the behaviors of bureaucrats who have policy expertise and exercise political 
neutrality. This became a problem. The reforms have aimed to design an insti- 
tution that constructs a governance system which allows for power transitions. 
Despite this aim, the Abe administration reestablished the relationship between 
the government and bureaucrats for realizing policies that the prime minister 
stresses. As a result, no further efforts to improve the neutrality and autonomy 
of the bureaucracy were made during the Abe era. In contrast with the DPJ 
administration, which could not avoid confrontation between the government 
and bureaucracy, Abe-LDP appropriately utilized the bureaucracy as well. It 
shows that Abe’s government operation was strategically effective. Despite this 
fact, it caused excessive involvement and constraints on bureaucracy at the same 
time. In order to secure the superiority of the LDP in government operation 
ability and complete the realignment of the governance structure that Japanese 
political reforms have pursed, the administration needs to establish a 
relationship between the government and bureaucracy with clear roles. Based 
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on the relationship, the administration has to establish a rational and transparent 
policy decision system. 
Finally, there is an unconformity between the reform strategy for the 
conservative shift and Japanese political reform. The strategy for the conservative 
shift devised by the LDP in the Abe era was effective in restoring the adminis- 
tration. However, it differs from the blueprint for Japanese political reform that 
aimed to achieve responsible politics through power transition by the electoral 
process. The electorate gave justification for political reforms to see a new 
system replace the Japanese system, namely, a system capable of responding 
swiftly to changes in the domestic and international environment, and a system 
that guarantees policy competition based on parties along with a swift, 
transparent policy decision by government and the ruling party. However, the 
purpose of the political reform has become a means to promote the reform to 
“recover national identity by realizing the normal state” in the Abe era. If swift 
responses and unified policy decisions do not occur, the government will be 
criticized as pursuing a politics-led conservative shift or over representing 
extreme rightists. Moreover, if power transition is difficult to take place through 
elections, it is necessary to consider responsibility for the consequences. In this 
sense, the post-Abe era faces a challenge of how to complement political 
responsiveness and accountability under a superior one party system. 
In the political history of the postwar period, the driving force for Japan to 
overcome crisis came from “self-renovation of the existing power.”24 Then, how 
will the LDP construct a new system for the post-postwar period? The self-
innovation of the LDP, which makes a virtuous cycle of the political process, 
would be one condition for Japan to complete the reform. 
• Translated by JEON Hae Jeong
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24. From the perspective of social history of politics, Amamiya (1997) points out that there was 
“self-innovation of the existing power (kisei seiryoku no jiko kakushin)” on the basis of continuity 
and discontinuity of the postwar system. He focuses on the process of social reintegration led by 
the second and third generations of local notables at the local government level. He sees it as the 
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suggests considering the post-postwar system by reviewing the prewar and postwar systems 
(Amamiya 2013).  
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